Abstract-The zero-error secrecy capacity of uncertain wiretap channels is defined. If the sensor-estimator channel is perfect, it is also calculated. Further properties are discussed. The problem of estimating a dynamical system with nonstochastic disturbances is studied where the sensor is connected to the estimator and an eavesdropper via an uncertain wiretap channel. The estimator should obtain a uniformly bounded estimation error whereas the eavesdropper's error should tend to infinity. It is proved that the system can be estimated securely if the zero-error capacity of the sensor-estimator channel is strictly larger than the logarithm of the system's unstable pole and the zero-error secrecy capacity of the uncertain wiretap channel is positive.
I. INTRODUCTION
If "independent noise" is assumed for every time step, it tends to be considered as stochastic in information theory. In contrast to this, robust control theory commonly treats dynamical systems with nonstochastic disturbances. In order to give a unified framework for the latter case, Nair has proposed a "nonstochastic information theory" [1] . The basic channel model in [1] is the newly introduced uncertain channel, a rule which determines which channel input can generate which channel outputs without weighting the possible outputs. For finite alphabets, every uncertain channel thus corresponds to a 0-1-matrix obtained from a stochastic matrix by replacing every positive entry by 1. Thus, uncertain channels are natural objects in zero-error information theory. Nair also introduced an analog to mutual information which plays the same role for the zero-error capacity of uncertain channels as mutual information for the capacity of discrete memoryless channels.
In [1] , Nair applied his nonstochastic information theory to the problem of estimating an unstable scalar dynamical system with nonstochastic disturbances at a remote location which obtains sensor data through an uncertain channel T. He showed that the estimation error can be bounded uniformly if the zero-error capacity C 0 (T) of T is strictly larger than the logarithm of the system's unstable pole λ > 1. This is "almost" necessary as well in the sense that C 0 (T) ≥ log λ is required for uniform boundedness of the estimation error.
In this paper we add to the above problem an eavesdropper overhearing the communication between sensor and estimator via a second uncertain channel. For every eavesdropper output sequence there should be two system paths whose distance tends to infinity with increasing time. We call this the problem of secure estimation. A similar problem has been studied for the stochastic case in [2] .
For our nonstochastic setting, this leads to the introduction of the uncertain wiretap channel: a pair (T B , T C ) of uncertain channels with common input alphabet. A zero-error wiretap code is a zero-error code for T B such that every eavesdropper output word can be generated by at least two different messages. Surprisingly, positivity of the zero-error secrecy capacity C 0 (T B , T C ) already is sufficient, in addition to Nair's sufficient condition for a bounded estimation error, in order for secure estimation to be possible.
The schemes for data transmission from the sensor to the estimator apply block codes. The error at inter-decoding times increases with communication delay. On the other hand, the estimation error at decoding times can be made to vanish asymptotically at the cost of increased delay. Similarly, we provide a lower bound on the speed of divergence for the eavesdropper's error which increases with increasing delay.
We calculate the secrecy capacity in the case of a perfect sensor-estimator channel. It either equals zero or the logarithm of the size of the input alphabet. An example shows that for general uncertain wiretap channels, no secure message transmission may be possible at blocklength 1, whereas a positive transmission rate is achieved for blocklengths ≥ 2. It also shows that encoders for zero-error wiretap codes in general have to be strictly uncertain channels, i. e. every message can be mapped to several possible codewords similar to the use of stochastic encoders for stochastic wiretap channels. We do not apply Nair's nonstochastic information-theoretic quantities in any of the analyses. Further, uncertain wiretap channels do not appear to provide new insights for the study of zero-error capacity, an overview of which is given in [3] .
Section II describes the problems considered, Section III presents the results and Section IV contains a selection of proof sketches. Full proofs are available in the extended version [8] of this paper.
II. MODEL A. Uncertain Channels
Let A, B be finite alphabets. An uncertain channel from A to B is a mapping T : A → 2 B * := 2 B \ {∅}. For any a ∈ A, the set T(a) is the family of possible output values of the channel given the input a. Only one of the elements of T(a) will actually be attained when transmitting a. That T(a) = ∅ for all a means that every input generates an output. We will write ran(T) for the set of possible outputs of T, i. e. ran(T) = ∪ a∈A T(a).
An M -code is a collection {F(m) : 1 ≤ m ≤ M } of nonempty and mutually disjoint subsets of A. This is equivalent to an uncertain channel F : {1, . . . , M } → 2 with disjoint output sets, so we will often denote such a code by F. The necessity of codes with |F(m)| ≥ 2 for some m is shown in Example 1. It is similar to the necessity of stochastic encoders for stochastic wiretap channels. Obviously, first applying F and then T leads to a new uncer-
Thus every possible channel output y ∈ ran(T • F) can be associated to a unique message m. For this to hold it is necessary that the sets F(m) be disjoint, which is the reason for this assumption in the definition of M -codes. Given an additional finite alphabet C, an uncertain wiretap channel is a pair of uncertain channels (T B : A → 2
The interpretation is that the outputs of channel T B are received by the intended receiver, whereas the outputs of T C are heard by an eavesdropper. See Fig. 1 for an example.
An M -code F is called a zero-error wiretap M -code for (T B , T C ) if it is a zero-error code for T B and additionally for every c ∈ ran(T C • F) there are messages m = m with
Thus every output c ∈ ran(T C • F) can be generated by at least two possible messages. We define the n-fold product of an uncertain channel T :
We call an M -code F on the alphabet A n a zero-error (M, n)- (2) is satisfied with T C •F replaced by T n C •F. We set N T B (n) to be the maximal M such that there exists a zero-error (M, n)-code for T B . Similarly, we set N (T B ,T C ) (n) to be the maximal M such that there exists a zero-error wiretap (M, n)-code for (T B , T C ). We then define
which are called the zero-error capacity of T B and the zero-error secrecy capacity of (T B , T C ), respectively. Due to the superadditivity of the sequences log N T B (n) and log N (T B ,T C ) (n), the suprema in (4) and (5) can be replaced by limits by the well-known Fekete's lemma [4] , see also [5] .
B. The Unstable Dynamical System
Let λ > 1 and consider the real-valued system
where w(t) is a nonstochastic disturbance with range
With
the range of possible values of this system at time t equals
, whose diameter grows exponentially in t. A sensor performs perfect state measurements, encodes them and sends them through an uncertain wiretap channel (T B , T C ). The dynamic system and the channel are synchronous, i. e. one symbol can be transmitted through the channel at every system time step. The goal is that the receiver of T B (the estimator) be able to estimate the state with bounded estimation error and the eavesdropper's estimation error tend to infinity.
Formally, a transmission scheme
consists of a bounded sequence of positive natural numbers (n k ) ∞ k=1 and,
and a mapping ϕ k : Y t k → R n k . Every uncertain channel f k maps the observations of the system state up till time t k into one of several possible codewords of length n k . The receiver of T B uses ϕ k to produce from all symbols received so far an estimatex(t k ), . . . ,x(t k+1 − 1) of the system states x(t k ), . . . , x(t k+1 − 1).
The minimal delay which has to be tolerated is max k n k . At this delay, the receiver has good estimates for the states at times t k but has to extrapolate for x(t k + 1), . . . , x(t k+1 − 1). In particular, for the first t 1 − 1 steps of the evolution, the estimator has to rely on a rule which is independent of any observations and which we assume to estimatex(t) = 0 (0 ≤ t ≤ t 1 − 1). Further, every system path (x(t)) ∞ t=0 generates a sequence (c t ) ∞ t=1 of eavesdropper outputs. Given a transmission scheme (n k , f k , ϕ k ) ∞ k=1 and a sequence of estimates (x(t)) ∞ t=0 , we denote by R B ((x(t)) ∞ t=0 ) the set of system paths (x(t)) ∞ t=0 which using the transmission scheme can generate (x(t)) ∞ t=0 . One can consider R B as an uncertain channel in the reverse direction with R ∞ as input and output alphabet. Similarly, for any infinite sequence (c t )
∞ t=1 let us define their distance to be (a t ) − (b t ) ∞ := sup t |a t − b t |. For a set S of sequences we define its diameter by
The transmission scheme (n k , f k , ϕ k ) ∞ k=1 is called reliable if the estimation error is bounded uniformly in the estimates, i. e. there exists a constant κ > 0 such that for every possible estimate sequence (x(t))
Note that security is an asymptotic property due to the boundedness of the range of possible system states in any finite time horizon, cf. (7).
III. RESULTS

A. Main Results
Theorem 1. A reliable and secure transmission scheme exists if
The main idea behind Theorem 1 is that the system's instability helps to achieve the goal of security as soon as a sufficiently large error on the eavesdropper side has been introduced at the beginning of transmission.
To apply Theorem 1, C 0 (T B ) and C 0 (T B , T C ) have to be known. However, the zero-error capacity C 0 (T B ) is unknown for most channels except a few special cases, cf. [3] . Neither do we provide a general formula for C 0 (T B , T C ) here. A solution can be given, though, when the calculation of C 0 (T B ) is trivial. For the proof of Theorem 2, it is sufficient to consider codes with |F(m)| = 1 for all 1 ≤ m ≤ M . The number of those elements of A n which cannot be used as codewords grows exponentially, at a rate which is less than log|A| if and only if there is no zero-error wiretap (M, 1)-code for (T B , T C ) for any M ≥ 2. Thus the number of elements of A n that can be used either asymptotically grows with rate log|A| or equals 0.
Theorem 2. If T B is an injective function from
A to B, then C 0 (T B , T C ) ∈ {0, log|A|}.
B. Estimation Error and Divergence Coefficient
As mentioned above, using a transmission scheme (n k , f k , ϕ k ) ∞ k=1 with delay max k n k , the estimates of system states x(t) with t = t k (k ∈ N) have to be extrapolated from the last good estimate. Thus the estimation error after a decoding time t k grows exponentially until the next decoding time t k+1 . However, for any ε > 0 the estimation error at times (t k ) ∞ k=1 can be made smaller than ε at least for large k if the inter-decoding intervals n k (k ∈ N) (and thus the inter-decoding estimate errors) are sufficiently large: Lemma 1. For every ε > 0 there exists a transmission scheme such that for every sequence (x(t)) ∞ t=0 of estimates and every (x(t))
If C 0 (T B , T C ) > log λ, then the limit superior can even be replaced by a supremum.
Another parameter of interest is the speed of divergence of the diameter of the set of possible system states given eavesdropper outputs (c t ) T t=1 as T → ∞. Given a zeroerror wiretap (M, n)-code F, we define for every possible eavesdropper channel output (c t )
Lemma 2. For every ε > 0 there exists a transmission scheme
such that for every eavesdropper output sequence (c t )
The term on the right-hand side of the inequality in Lemma 2 is positive if ε is chosen small enough. The case sup n ∆ (T B ,T C ) (n) = 1 corresponds to complete eavesdropper ignorance, cf. (7).
C. Uncertain Wiretap Channels
We first note that the divergence coefficient increases with increasing blocklength. Thus we find a trade-off between the growth rate for the eavesdropper's estimation error and delay:
Next we have a closer look at the zero-error secrecy capacity of uncertain wiretap channels. To study the zero-error capacity of an uncertain channel T : A → 2 B * , one associates to it the following graph G(T): its vertex set equals A and an edge is drawn between a, a ∈ A if T(a) ∩ T(a ) = ∅. In that case we write a ∼ a .
The graph G(T n ) corresponding to the n-fold product channel T n (see (3)) is the strong n-fold product of G(T)
Here for any graph G with vertex set A, the strong product G 2 of G with itself is defined as follows: The vertex set of G 2 is A 2 and (a 1 , a 2 ) ∼ (a 1 , a 2 ) if 1) a 1 ∼ a 1 and a 2 = a 2 or 2) a 2 ∼ a 2 and a 1 = a 1 or 3) a 1 ∼ a 1 and a 2 ∼ a 2 .
Finding the zero-error capacity of T now amounts to finding the asymptotic behavior as n → ∞ of the sizes of maximal independent systems of the graphs G(T n ), cf. [3] . We define an independent system in a graph as a set {F (1), . . . , F(M )} of mutually disjoint subsets of the vertex set A such that no two vertices a, a belonging to different subsets F(m) = F(m ) are connected by an edge.
To treat uncertain wiretap channels (T B , T C ), we consider a hypergraph structure H(T n C ) induced on A n in addition to the graph structure G(T n B ). A hypergraph consists of a vertex set together with a set of subsets, called hyperedges, of this vertex set. The vertex set of H(T n C ) equals A n . Every hyperedge is generated by a (c t ) n t=1 ∈ C n : we set e((c t )
n , cf. [6] . For any hypergraph H with vertex set A and hyperedge set E ⊂ 2 A , the square product H 2 of H with itself is defined as follows: The vertex set of H 2 is A 2 and the hyperedge set equals E 2 := {e × e : e, e ∈ E}. A zero-error wiretap (M, n)-code F then is nothing but a collection of disjoint subsets {F (1), . . . , F(M )} of A n satisfying the two following properties:
1) It is an independent system for G(T This behavior of zero-error wiretap codes for general uncertain wiretap channels is remarkable when it is compared to the behavior of zero-error codes for uncertain channels: An uncertain channel T has C 0 (T) > 0 if and only if there exists an independent system for G(T) with size ≥ 2. Similarly, a stochastic DMC has positive capacity if and only if its blocklength-1 transmission matrix does not have identical rows. For the secrecy capacity of stochastic wiretap channels, there is van Dijk's criterion [7] for positivity which concerns the blocklength-1 wiretap channel matrix and requires to check a certain function for concavity. Observe also that in order to obtain a (4, 2)-code for the above channel, one message m has to be encoded into a set with |F(m)| ≥ 2. A simpler example illustrating the necessity of codes with |F(m)| ≥ 2 for some m is Example 2 in [8] .
IV. SELECTED PROOF SKETCHES A. Proof of Theorem 1: Preliminaries
The first choice to make is the quantizer used by the sensor. For sufficient generality, we assume the rule (6a), but x(0) ∈ I 0 for some real interval I 0 . Let M ≥ 2 ∈ N. Setting P m0,0 := I 0 , we recursively define for t ≥ 1 and 1 ≤ m ≤ M [A(t), B(t)] = λP mt−1,t
m t = m if x(t) ∈ P m,t .
In the definition of m t , an uncertain mapping is applied to associate x(t) to one of the two possible values if it lies on the boundary between two partition intervals P m,t , P m+1,t . For every t ∈ N, the interval P mt,t is the set of system states which are possible at time t according to the sequence (m i )
Next assume that we have two systems obeying (6a). The paths of one of them start in an interval I 0 and those of the other in an I 0 with |I 0 | = |I 0 |. The same quantizer rules (8)-(10) are applied for both systems, generating sequences (m t ) ∞ t=1 and (m t ) ∞ t=1 , respectively. For t ≥ 0, denote bŷ x(t) the mid point of P mt,t and byx (t) that of P m t ,t . The following two lemmas are used in the security analysis of the scheme we are going to define and are proved using a recursion formula [8] for the sequences (x(t))
